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Optimus Labs · CivilizationsHIGH · NTH-PARTY DATA EXPOSURE

Live incident, as of Nov 14, 2026. Fireworks, Notion and Cursor say their investigations continue, and Uber's state notices are still being filed. This page will be updated.

The Fireworks Breach Went Downstream: Notion AI Chats, Cursor Agent Traces, Uber Driver Licenses

Zero data retention covered live requests. It did not cover the copies kept for analytics, training and sharing. Three Fireworks customers have disclosed impact, and the companies that use their products now owe their own customers answers they don't yet have.

InferenceCredentialAgent

Full advisory deck

Organizations in this briefing

Fireworks AIFireworks AI
NotionNotion
CursorCursor
UberUber

Key takeaways

2 min read
  • As of Nov 14, 2026. Attackers who breached Fireworks AI, an inference provider, reached data its customers had stored, not live requests. Notion lost Notion AI chat transcripts kept for its Insights feature (under 1% of workspaces). Cursor says a key it issued to Fireworks let the attacker copy 2025 coding-agent traces from sessions not in Privacy Mode, and credentials in those traces led to the tampered Claude Code extension in its store. Uber has notified drivers whose license data Fireworks held. A leaked key can be rotated. Leaked patient, client or trial data cannot.
  • Blast radius: Every company whose people used Notion AI with Insights or Cursor without Privacy Mode, every Uber driver named in its notices, and every Fireworks customer that stored datasets, batch jobs, secrets or models with it. Fireworks describes its customer base as more than 10,000 (Bloomberg Law) to tens of thousands (Notion). Disclosed victims are a floor; more are expected.
  • HIGH · NTH-PARTY DATA EXPOSURE

Timeline

  1. Fireworks finds stolen internal credentials in use

    Evaluation-job environment variables read; customers told from Oct 7.

  2. Fireworks tells Uber its data was reached

    Per Uber's state notices, via TechCrunch.

  3. Second path: breached cloud provider

    On Oct 24 the attacker reaches Fireworks development machines and more customer data.

  4. Tampered Claude Code builds in Cursor's store

    About 11 hours; at most 5,000 users may have received them.

  5. Last attacker activity Cursor sees, blocked

  6. Fireworks alerts Notion; Notion disconnects

    Disconnected Nov 3, data at Fireworks deleted Nov 4.

  7. Fireworks confirms Notion's dataset

    Notion AI chat transcripts used for Insights.

  8. Notion notifies customers; Fireworks publishes update

  9. Notion revokes exposed keys, reports others' keys

    Third-party keys reported to issuers on Nov 12.

  10. Cursor publishes root cause; Uber notices reported

Blast radius
Every company whose people used Notion AI with Insights or Cursor without Privacy Mode, every Uber driver named in its notices, and every Fireworks customer that stored datasets, batch jobs, secrets or models with it. Fireworks describes its customer base as more than 10,000 (Bloomberg Law) to tens of thousands (Notion). Disclosed victims are a floor; more are expected.

Summary

Fireworks AI runs open models for other companies' products. Its own documents say live requests are zero data retention by default, and that features which store data, such as batch jobs, stored responses and training, are not. Attackers reached Fireworks twice, through stolen internal credentials found on Oct 6 and through a breached cloud provider on Oct 23 to 24, and took the stored kind. Notion says Notion AI chat transcripts kept for its Insights feature were taken, for under 1% of workspaces. Cursor says an access key it had issued to Fireworks was exposed and used to copy coding-agent traces, and that credentials left in those traces led, in the end, to the tampered Claude Code extension in its store on Oct 29. Uber is notifying drivers whose license data was held by Fireworks. Our view: the companies that use Notion and Cursor are one step further out, and many cannot yet tell their own customers whether their data was in it.

Am I affected?

Any single yes means treat this as an incident.

  • Did anyone in your company use Notion AI while the Insights feature was on, and did Notion send you a notice?
  • Did anyone use Cursor in 2025 without Privacy Mode, or send credentials to Cursor support?
  • Are you an Uber driver, or do you hold Uber driver data, in a state where Uber has filed a notice?
  • Do you, or a vendor of yours, send data to Fireworks for batch inference, stored responses, datasets, training or evaluation jobs with secrets?

Not affected if

  • Notion says workspaces it has not contacted were not identified as affected, and no action is needed right now.
  • Cursor says Privacy Mode prompts and code, live inference, customer repositories, release-signing keys and its official app were not reached.
  • Fireworks says it has detected no impact to Inference (its CEO adds "excluding batch inference"), Training SDK or Nexus.

All three "not affected" lines are the vendors' own claims, and all three investigations are still open.

What happened

Oct 6. Fireworks found someone using its internal credentials to read environment variables, including API keys, in evaluation jobs for a limited number of customer accounts. It told affected customers from Oct 7. Uber says its provider told it on Oct 9 that stolen internal credentials had been used to reach Uber data.

Oct 23 to 24. A third-party cloud provider hosting Fireworks research machines was breached. The next day the attacker used it to reach Fireworks development machines and ran a workload that, in Fireworks' words, "led to additional customer data impact": account and billing data, and for a limited set of accounts secrets, datasets and unfinished model weights. Fireworks links the group to LLMJacking, selling stolen model access.

Oct 29 to Nov 1. Per Cursor, credentials found in the copied traces led into some of its SaaS tools, and a credential taken from there let the attacker place tampered Claude Code builds in the cache behind Cursor's extension store on Oct 29. Cursor last saw the attacker on Nov 1, and that attempt was blocked.

Nov 2 to 13. Fireworks told Notion on Nov 2 that data had been accessed; the first dataset was synthetic test data. On Nov 3 Notion cut its systems off from Fireworks and on Nov 4 deleted its data there. On Nov 8 Fireworks confirmed the final dataset, which held real Notion AI chat transcripts. Notion told affected customers on Nov 9, revoked exposed Notion keys on Nov 11 and on Nov 12 reported other companies' keys found in the chats to the vendors that issued them. Cursor published its root cause on Nov 13. The same day TechCrunch reported Uber's notices to drivers.

This story continues our Four Custodians briefing, where Fireworks was one of the platforms holding customer keys in October.

You can rotate a key. You can't rotate a diagnosis.

Every vendor in this story tells customers to rotate exposed keys, and that is the right first step. It is also the only part of the response that fully works. A key can be revoked and re-issued in minutes. A patient note pasted into an AI chat, a client's account history in a coding trace, a trial participant's record in a dataset, or a driver's license number cannot be revoked, recalled or re-issued. Once it is copied, it stays copied.

For a hospital, a bank or a drug maker, the vendor's breach becomes its own problem. Its customers, patients and regulators ask it, not Fireworks, what was taken. The answer depends on a chain it did not choose: which AI feature its staff used, which settings were on, which provider that feature called and what the provider stored.

Our view. In our conversations with security leaders since Notion's notice, the companies that use Notion AI and Cursor, especially in healthcare, financial services and pharma, have struggled to answer their own customers. Did zero data retention apply? Were our people's chats in the set? What happened to the keys and secrets Notion and Cursor held for us? The answers sit two vendors away, and many contracts signed in the past year never asked for them.

Zero data retention by default is not zero data retention everywhere

Fireworks' Oct 9 bulletin said: "Fireworks does not store prompts or outputs by default, as our platform is ZDR." That holds for live requests. Its data-handling page also says: "Zero Data Retention does not apply to certain services that require data storage, including Batch API and Responses API." Its enterprise policy page adds: "A few features do store customer content, such as stored responses, batch jobs, and training." The policy that blocks those features is off by default, and turning it on does not delete what is already stored.

The Nov 9 update says Fireworks has "not detected any impact to Inference, Training SDK and Nexus, which are all zero data retention (ZDR) by default." CEO Lin Qiao's post on X, as quoted by VentureBeat, reads "Inference (excluding batch inference)". The breach reached the stored side.

Be precise about what this proves. Cursor's traces sat in a storage bucket Cursor used to share data with Fireworks, from sessions it was allowed to use for model training. Notion's transcripts were kept for Insights, a feature that classifies chats to show admins how their teams use AI. Neither Notion nor Fireworks has said which Fireworks feature held them, and no one has published a contract showing a no-storage promise that was broken. The accurate line: the exposed data was stored on purpose, outside the live-request path that zero data retention covers.

The question to ask any AI vendor is not "are you ZDR?" It is "which of your features keep our data, for how long, where, and which of your providers can reach it?"

Three downstream paths

Notion. Taken: Notion AI chat transcripts used for Insights, for under 1% of workspaces. Notion says most were not labelled with the writer or workspace and held no tool call results, but anything typed into the chat is in them, and chat text can still name people and companies. Render's CEO shared Notion's notice that Render's workspace was among those affected, per The Register. Notion has turned Insights off, no longer serves open models through Fireworks, and tells affected customers to "treat this data as if it were exposed."

Cursor. Taken: coding-agent traces, mostly from 2025, from sessions not in Privacy Mode, for fewer than 0.05% of users; API credentials for fewer than 0.01% of customers. From there the attacker reached archived non-production source code, limited support data and email, usage metrics and contact details, summaries of some agent conversations, and credentials users had sent to Cursor support. The chain ended with tampered Claude Code builds 2.1.312 and 2.1.313 that at most 5,000 users may have received, covered in our Claude Code extension briefing. Cursor has moved all inference off Fireworks and rotated every credential in use across its internal systems.

Uber. Taken: personal and driver's license data, per notices TechCrunch saw: 2,567 people in Massachusetts, 3,430 in South Carolina and 1,873 in Rhode Island, with Illinois pending. Uber's spokesperson said the notices relate to "a security incident impacting one of our third-party vendors, Fireworks.ai, which had access to some Uber data." These are the first regulatory filings reported in this incident.

Others. Fireworks says it is working with "Notion, Cursor and others". Harvey is a named Fireworks customer; no Harvey data loss has been reported.

Our read: in each path the prize was data a customer chose to store for a second purpose: analytics, training or a shared bucket. The inventory you keep lists the AI tools your people use. It does not list the stores those tools keep, or the provider behind them. That is where this one lived.

Playbook: when your vendor's vendor is breached

For the companies that use Notion AI, Cursor or any tool built on Fireworks: get answers, then give them.

Your customers will not wait for Fireworks' forensics. They want to know, from you, whether their data was involved and what changes now. These eight steps get you there. Sector notes follow.

  1. Ask your vendor, in writing

    1. Send five questions this week

    1. Were we in the affected set, and which users? 2. Which feature or store held our data, and did zero data retention apply to it? 3. Which of our keys, tokens or secrets were found, and who revoked them, when? 4. When was our data deleted at the provider, and can you show it? 5. Which other AI providers touch our data, and where?

  2. 2. Account for every secret they held

    List what your people pasted into Notion AI chats, left in Cursor sessions or sent to support: API keys, passwords, tokens, connection strings. Revoke each at the issuer, not the tool, and record the date. Notion and Cursor say they revoked what they found; confirm it covers yours.

  3. Answer your customers

    3. Send a notice now, update it later

    Say what happened two vendors away, whether their data was involved or what is still unknown, what you rotated and deleted, what they should do, what you are changing, and when you will update them. A dated "we don't know yet" beats silence.

  4. 4. Answer the ZDR question plainly

    Retention applies per feature, not per vendor. Say which features your teams used, whether those features stored data, and whether that data was in the exposed set. Do not repeat "our vendor is ZDR" unless you have confirmed it covers the feature in question.

  5. 5. Treat sensitive data as gone

    Keys can be rotated. Health, financial and trial data cannot. If any may have been in the chats or traces, plan for notice, monitoring and support for the people it describes, and log the decision and its reasons.

  6. Before the next AI contract

    6. Map the vendor's vendors

    Get each AI vendor's list of model providers and subprocessors, per feature, with storage location and retention. Require notice before a new provider is added and a breach notice deadline in hours.

  7. 7. Turn off what you don't need

    Use Privacy Mode or the equivalent on every seat, opt out of training and analytics features that store chats, and keep secrets out of prompts, traces and support tickets with scanning at the source.

    The master key wraps the data key, and the data key seals the customer's provider key.
  8. 8. Scope what you hand over

    Keys you issue to a vendor should be short-lived, limited to one bucket or job, and logged. Cursor's chain started with a key it had issued to Fireworks.

Sector notes: notice clocks that may apply

Not legal advice. Confirm with counsel which apply to you. As of Nov 14, Uber's US state notices are the only regulatory filings reported in this incident.

Healthcare. If staff may have put protected health information (PHI) into an AI tool, check whether the tool's vendor signed a business associate agreement and whether it covers that vendor's own providers. Under HIPAA, a business associate must notify the covered entity without unreasonable delay and within 60 days of discovery.

Financial services. New York DFS Part 500 requires notice of a qualifying cybersecurity incident, including one at a third-party service provider, within 72 hours. US public companies must file an SEC Form 8-K within four business days of deciding an incident is material.

Pharma and life sciences. Trial participant data and unpublished results are both personal and commercially sensitive. In the EU and UK, GDPR requires a processor to tell the controller without undue delay, and the controller to tell the regulator within 72 hours unless the breach is unlikely to put people at risk.

What to do now

List every product your teams use that runs on Fireworks, directly or through a vendor. Start with Notion AI and Cursor; ask each AI vendor for its own list of AI providers.

If you use Notion AI: check for Notion's notice, retrieve the affected data through the steps it sent, and treat those chats as exposed. Rotate any password, API key or credential your people pasted into Notion AI.

If you use Cursor: confirm whether Privacy Mode was on for every seat in 2025, rotate the keys Cursor's admin email named, and rotate anything your people sent to Cursor support.

If you are an Uber driver or partner, read Uber's notice and watch for identity fraud using your driver's license details.

If you call Fireworks yourself, replace revoked Fireworks keys, rotate third-party secrets at the issuer, and review datasets, batch jobs and training jobs you did not create.

Write to Notion and Cursor and ask the five vendor questions in the playbook below. Get the answers in writing before you brief your own customers.

Send your customers a notice that says what you know, what is still unknown and when you will update them. Silence reads as "we don't know".

Before the next AI contract is signed, ask which features keep data, for how long and where, not only whether the vendor is "ZDR".

What we still don't know

Which Fireworks feature or store held Notion's transcripts. Which of the two Fireworks intrusions reached each customer's data; Uber's notice points to the first. Which SaaS tools Cursor's attacker used; Cursor has not named them. How many Fireworks customers are affected in total. Whether any regulator outside the US states named in Uber's filings has been notified.

Sources

Sourcing & confidence

Confirmed by the vendor

  • Fireworks: stolen internal credentials found Oct 6; second path through a breached cloud provider on Oct 23 to 24; account, billing, secrets, datasets and unfinished model weights affected for limited accounts; no detected impact to Inference, Training SDK or Nexus.
  • Fireworks documentation: zero data retention does not apply to Batch API and Responses API; stored responses, batch jobs and training store customer content; the blocking policy is off by default.
  • Notion: Notion AI chat transcripts used for Insights taken, under 1% of workspaces, mostly unattributable, no tool call results; Fireworks disconnected Nov 3, data deleted Nov 4, Notion keys revoked Nov 11, third-party keys reported Nov 12.
  • Cursor: an access key it issued to Fireworks was exposed; 2025 traces from non-Privacy-Mode sessions copied; credentials in them led to SaaS tools and the Oct 29 tampered extension; inference moved off Fireworks; last attacker activity Nov 1, blocked.
  • Uber, via TechCrunch: driver's license data held by Fireworks taken; notices filed with several US state attorneys general.

Assessed by Civilizations

  • Optimus Labs: companies using Notion AI and Cursor, especially in regulated sectors, have struggled to answer their own customers. Based on our conversations with security leaders, not a survey.
  • Optimus Labs: the exposed data sat outside the live-request path that zero data retention covers. Neither Notion nor Fireworks has named the feature that held Notion's transcripts, and no broken contractual promise has been shown.
  • Optimus Labs: the sector notice deadlines are general pointers, not a finding that any applies here.
  • Disclosed victims are a floor. Fireworks says it is working with other customers.

Vendor perspective · Optimus Labs

How Optimus Labs helps

The first question in this incident was "who uses Notion AI and Cursor, with which settings?" Optimus Labs discovers the agents and AI tools on every endpoint, records each one's posture, such as whether Cursor's Privacy Mode is on, and maps each to an owner, so you can answer your customers with names and settings, not guesses.

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Optimus Labs · Civilizations

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